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Abstract—The impact of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
for providing situational awareness to transmission system operators has been widely documented. Micro-PMUs (µPMUs)
are an emerging sensing technology that can provide similar
benefits to Distribution System Operators (DSOs), enabling a
level of visibility into the distribution grid that was previously
unattainable. In order to support the deployment of these
high resolution sensors, the automation of data analysis and
prioritizing communication to the DSO becomes crucial. In this
paper, we explore the use of µPMUs to detect anomalies on
the distribution grid. Our methodology is motivated by growing
concern about failures and attacks to distribution automation
equipment. The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated
through both real and simulated data.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Anomaly Detection, MicroPhasor Measurement Unit, Distribution Grid

I. I NTRODUCTION
The state vectors of the transmission grid are closely
monitored and their physical behavior is well-understood
[1]. In contrast, Distribution System Operators (DSOs) have
historically lacked detailed real-time actionable information
about their system. This, however, is set to change. As the
distribution grid shifts from a demand serving network towards
an interactive grid, there is a growing interest in gaining
situational awareness via advanced sensors such as MicroPhasor Measurement Units (µPMUs) [2].
The deployment of the µPMUs in isolation without additional data driven applications and analytics is insufficient. It is
critical to equip DSOs with complimentary software tools that
are capable of automatically mining these large data sets in
search of useful, actionable information. There has been a lot
of work focused on using PMU data at the transmission level
to improve Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control
(WAMPC) [3], [4]. The distribution grid, however, is lagging
in this respect. Due to inherent differences between operational
behavior, such as imbalances and increased variability on the
distribution and transmission grid, the algorithms derived for
WAMPC at the transmission level are generally not directly
applicable at the distribution level. Our work is aimed at
addressing this issue. We focus on an important application
of µPMU data in the distribution system: anomaly detection,
i.e., behavior that differs significantly from normal operation
of the grid during (quasi) steady-state. An anomaly can take

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41543
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND

a number of forms, including faults, misoperations of devices
or switching transients, among others, and its root cause can
be either a natural occurrence, error or attack. The risk of
cyber-physical attacks via an IP network has recently gained
significant interest due to the increase in automation of our
power gird via two-way communication. This communication
is typically carried out on breachable networks that can be
manipulated by attackers [5]. Even if an anomaly naturally
occurs, it is important to notify the DSO to ensure proper
remedial action is taken.
A. Related Work
The majority of published work in anomaly detection using
sensor data, primarily SCADA and PMU data, has focused
on the transmission grid. The proposed methods are typically
data-driven approaches, whereby the measurements are inspected for abnormality irrespective of the underlying physical
model. One such example, the common path data mining
approach implemented on PMU data and audit logs at a central
server, is proposed in [6] to classify between a disturbance, an
attack via IP computer networks and normal operation. Chen
et al., [7] derive a linear basis expansion for the PMU data to
reduce the dimensionality of the measurements. Through this
linear basis expansion, it is shown how an anomaly, which
changes the grid operating point, can be spotted by comparing
the error of the projected data onto the subspace spanned by
the basis and the actual values. Valenzuela et al., [8] used
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to classify the power
flow results into regular and irregular subspaces. Through
analyzing the data residing in the irregular subspace, their
method determines whether the irregularity is caused by a
network attack or not. Jamei et al., [9] propose an intrusion
detection architecture that leverages µPMU data and SCADA
communication over IP networks to detect potentially damaging activities in the grid. These aforementioned algorithms are
all part of the suite of machine learning techniques that the
security monitoring architecture will rely on.
B. Our Contribution
µPMUs, due to their high sampling frequency, are a much
richer data source in comparison to traditional Distribution
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (DSCADA). In this
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paper, we highlight the capability of µPMUs to detect transient
events by proposing a set of rules for anomaly detection. The
main advantages of our new approach are:
1) The underlying physical model of the data forms the basis
in deriving the detection method; providing an interpretation
of the event that is lacking in a model free approach.
2) The distribution grid is modeled allowing unbalanced
loading and non-transposed lines. The rules are formulated
in such a way that allow for distribution grids with neutral
wires, and single-phase or two-phase laterals.
3) Quasi steady-state, rather than steady-state, is considered
the norm for grid behavior.
4) Part of the proposed methodology only requires the phasor
data stream of a single µPMU and is agnostic of the grid
interconnection parameters, while the other part correlates
the phasor streams across multiple µPMUs using electrical
properties of the grid.
The detection method applicable to the measurements of a
single µPMU is particularly attractive from a security perspective because, assuming that the algorithms are programmed
onto the sensor itself, no network communication exchange is
needed to obtain results. Therefore, the attacker will have to
directly compromise the sensor to alter its response and erase
evidence of a physical change.
In addition to defining these algorithms, we explore their
effectiveness in the field via an actual deployment of µPMUs
designed by our partners at Power Standards Lab. These
devices output the three phase voltage and current phasors
at specific locations on the distribution grid [10] at a rate
of 120 Hz. The proprietary filtering implemented within the
device, which differs from the options for the filter given in
the C.37.118 standard [11], overcomes some of the technical
obstacles limiting the deployment of conventional PMUs on
the distribution grid. Technical obstacles in real world deployments include the presence of signal noise and smaller
voltage angle differences. These devices are also inexpensive,
which is a key feature for distribution sensors [12]. We also
investigate the sensitivity of our rules with respect to a set of
attack scenarios on the µPMU, and the grid connectivity data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the µPMU data model. Section III presents
the π model of a distribution line, and the relationship
between the voltage and current phasors in quasi steadystate conditions. Section IV forms the body of our work that
concerns itself with the formulation of the rules and tracking
the anomalies. The effectiveness of the proposed rules, and
their sensitivity to partially-compromised data, are tested using
real and simulated data in Section V. The conclusion follows
in Section VI.

the difference between using phasor information compared to
higher resolution time domain samples, we review the notion
of a phasor, or complex envelope, in this section and tie its
formal derivation to the actual implementation in practical
µPMU sensors (including the C.37.118 standard [11]).
The phasor is, in signal theory, often referred to as the
complex envelope, or the complex baseband equivalent representation, of an arbitrary signal s(t). In its textbook derivation,
it is obtained in two steps. In the first step, the frequency
content of the signal at negative frequencies is removed, which
leads to a complex signal called an analytic signal, s+ (t). The
time domain mapping from s(t) to s+ (t) is as follows1 :
s+ (t) =

(1)

The second term in the sum is the Hilbert transform of the
signal. The complex envelope, or phasor, can then be extracted
by shifting down the analytic signal in the frequency domain
and scaling it or, equivalently, demodulating and scaling the
signal in the time-domain2 :
√
(2)
s̃(t) = 2s+ (t)e−j2πf0 t .
From (2) and (1) it is easy to see that:
√
s(t) = 2<[s̃(t)ej2πf0 t ].

(3)

If power spectral density of the signal s(t) is centered
around f0 , then the complex representation is the smoothest
signal that one can associate to s(t). The mapping is one to
one, and therefore, there is no loss of information. Actual
µPMUs do not perform the envelope this way, as explained in
the following section.
A. Practical Implementations of µPMUs
The Hilbert transform requires implementing a non-causal
filter with infinite impulse response, hence, it is purely theoretical. While there are other ways of approximating the Hilbert
filter, the simplest implementation of the µPMU is based on
the following observations. Replacing the operator that takes
the real part of the modulated complex envelope in (3), by
the scaled summation of the modulated complex phasor and
its
and multiplying both sides of equation (3) by
√ conjugate
2e−j2πf0 t , we have :
√

2s(t)e−j2πf0 t =

s̃(t) + s̃∗ (t)e−j4πf0 t
2

(4)

This representation is insightful since we can observe that a
low-pass filter,
√ h(t), can extract the correct envelope s̃(t) from
the signal 2s(t)e−j2πf0 t if and only if:

II. µPMU DATA M ODELING
Assuming normal conditions, µPMUs are designed to report
120 samples per sec. of the three phase voltage phasors,
denoted as v[k] ∈ C3×1 , and the current phasors, i[k] ∈ C3×1 ,
at specific points on the distribution network. To help understand the effect of transients on µPMU measurements, and

j
1
s(t) +
? s(t)
2
2πt

s̃(t) ? h(t) = s̃(t)
∗

s̃ (t)e

−j4πf0 t

(5)

? h(t) = 0

(6)

1 The

operator ? stands
√ for convolution.
reason for the 2 scaling is that the signal and its envelope have the
same power and energy.
2 The
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For the bandpass signal s(t) centered around f0 , that has a
limited support [f0 − W1 , f0 + W2 ], these two conditions are
satisfied if:
W/2 ≤ f0 , W = W1 + W2 .
Accordingly, the mapping becomes:
√
s̃(t) = 2(s(t)e−j2πf0 t ) ? h(t)

(7)

iija
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(8)

This means that the phasor can be extracted without obtaining
the analytic signal if (5)-(6) hold, and the filter frequency
response H(f ) is flat within the bandwidth of the signal and
isolates its spectrum, emulating an ideal low pass filter.
B. Information from µPMUs During a Transient
In normal conditions, the mains AC voltage and current are
very close approximations of bandpass signals with a narrow
support centered around the frequency f0 = 50/60 Hz. In turn,
(7) holds in the quasi steady-state scenario and for some types
of transients. Because of the normally-small frequency support
of the AC signals, the dynamic effects of the electrical wires
are not apparent, and their effects can be approximated by a
scaling and phase rotation equal to the amplitude and phase of
their frequency response at the center frequency. This results in
the well-known algebraic equations used in steady-state power
systems analysis.
During a severe transient, however, the envelope that is
obtained through (2) is not the signal envelope, not just
because frequency content is effectively cut by h(t), but also
because of the component in (6) that is not zero and the
spilling of its tail into the band selected by h(t) distorts
the content. In either case, however distorted, the signal that
emerges out of the filter h(t) is band-limited, and can therefore
be sampled without aliasing at a rate of 2f0 Hz.
Our proposed methodology is to monitor whether the instantaneous µPMU measurements of voltage and current phasors
belong to a complex hyperplane compatible with the algebraic
steady-state version of Ohm’s law for a three-phase unbalanced
system. In the next section, we introduce the general MultiInput Multi-Output (MIMO) representation of a distribution
line and its quasi steady-state representation. These equations
form the cornerstone of our anomaly detection rules.
III. D ISTRIBUTION L INE MIMO M ODELING
The π model of a distribution line that connects bus i to
j is shown in Fig. 1 where Y ij (f ) denotes the three phase
series admittance of the line (i, j) and Y sh
ij (f ) is the three
phase shunt admittance matrix of that line. The modeling of
the self and mutual impedance, rather than using the positive
sequence representation, is essential for accurately modeling
the distribution grid since it does not impose the assumption of
a balanced system nor transposition of the lines. In addition,
this representation enables us to include three phase, two
phase, and single phase lines with/without neutrals by using
their 3 × 3 phase frame matrix model that is obtained from
the modified Carson’s equations and Kron reduction [13].

Bus j
a

ibji

Y jish ( f )

g

g

Fig. 1. π Model of the Distribution Line

It is well known in linear systems theory that the relationship between the voltage and the current signals in a
passive Linear-Time Invariant (LTI) circuit with a known
admittance matrix can be represented as the multiplication in
the frequency domain and as a convolution in the time domain,
which also takes MIMO form due to the three-phase modeling.
The relationship also holds between the complex envelopes of
the signals.
Denoting the baseband model of the line admittance matrices frequency response around the center frequency as
sh
sh
yij (f ) = Y sh
ij (f + f0 )H(f ), yij (f ) = Y ij (f + f0 )H(f ),
we have:
sh
iij (f ) = (yij
(f ) + yij (f ))v i (f ) − yij (f )v j (f )

iij (t) =

(y sh
ij (t)

+ y ij (t)) ∗ vi (t) − y ij (t) ∗ vj (t)

(9)
(10)

where y sh
ij (t) and y ij (t) are the time-domain equivalence of
the baseband shunt and admittance matrices respectively. We
will use the following notation for brevity in the remainder:
Y ij (f ) , Y sh
ij (f ) + Y ij (f )
sh
yij (f ) , yij
(f ) + yij (f )

y ij (t) , y sh
ij (t) + y ij (t)
Using this defined notation, (9) and (10) can be re-written as:
iij (f ) = yij (f )v i (f ) − yij (f )v j (f )

(11)

iij (t) = y ij (t) ∗ vi (t) − y ij (t) ∗ vj (t)

(12)

For the discrete time samples of the output of the µPMU, the
counterpart of (12) is:
iij [k] =

N
−1
X
n=0

y ij [n]vi [k − n] −

N
−1
X

y ij [n]vj [k − n]

(13)

n=0

where the assumption is that y sh
ij [n] and y ij [n] are the samples
of y sh
ij (t) and y ij (t), respectively, and that they are causal and
have a finite support of N .
In the quasi-steady state condition, the fundamental frequency of the voltage and current signals is always changing, albeit slowly and over a very small range, because of
load-generation imbalances, active power demand interactions,
large generators inertia, and the automatic speed controllers
of the generators [14]. As a result, the off-nominal frequency
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affects the phase angle captured by µPMUs. Fig. 2 shows
the three phase unwrapped angle of the voltage phasor data
captured by a µPMU installed at our partner utility grid, which
clearly shows the grid is working at off-nominal frequency
where the frequency drift is not even fixed over time though
varies slowly. Mathematically, it is insightful to decompose
unwrapped angle of voltage phasor
30

a
b
c

25

where T = 1/120 sec. is the sampling interval of the µPMU,
we can introduce the following two matrices:

 

1
βi [k]
βi [k]
Y ij (f0 , k) , Y ij f0 +
H
,
T
2πT
2πT

 

(18)
1
βj [k]
βj [k]
Y ij (f0 , k) , Y ij f0 +
H
,
T
2πT
2πT
and therefore we can write (16) as follows:
iij [k] = Y ij (f0 , k)vi [k] − Y ij (f0 , k)vj [k]

(19)

angle (rad)
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Fig. 2. Unwrapped Voltage Phasor Angle During Quasi-Steady State

the phasor vi [k] and iij [k] as follows:
vi [k] = v̂i [k]ejβi [k]k , iij [k] = îij [k]ejβi [k]k

(14)

where v̂i [k] is the voltage phasor that is captured at nominal
frequency, and îij [k] is the current phasor after removing
the exponential term due to βi [k] that captures the timevarying drift in the frequency previously described. We can
then write(13) in the following way:
iij [k] =
−

N
−1
X
n=0
N
−1
X

y ij [n]v̂i [k − n]ejβi [k][k−n](k−n)
(15)
y ij [n]v̂j [k − n]e

The variations of the v̂i [k] and β[k] can be approximately
neglected over N samples of the discrete time convolution
in (13), i.e., v̂i [k − n] ≈ v̂i [k] and βi [k − n] ≈ βi [k] for
n = 0, . . . , N − 1. Followed by this approximation, we can
write:
N
−1
X
iij [k] ≈
y ij [n]v̂i [k]ejβi [k](k−n)
−

=
−

y ij [n]v̂j [k]ejβj [k](k−n)

n=0
N
−1
X
n=0
N
−1
X

(16)

!
y ij [n]e

−jβi [k]n

vi [k]

!
y ij [n]e−jβj [k]n

IV. A NOMALY D ETECTION
When the power grid is no longer in quasi-steady state
conditions, the relationship between voltage and the current
phasors manifests its full dynamic behavior. What we propose
is to inspect the validity of the memoryless algebraic equations
to flag the existence of transients in the grid. Equation (19)
provides the basis for our rule.
A. Single µPMU Metric

jβj [k][k−n](k−n)

n=0

n=0
N
−1
X

Equation (19) is Ohm’s law in the phasor domain under the
quasi-steady state and comprises part of our anomaly detection
algorithm derived in the next section. The corresponding
equation for the steady state can be simply obtained by setting
β[k] = 0 in (19).
From the analysis above, and specifically equation (19), it
is clear that the effect of the quasi-steady state in the phasor
domain is the modulation of the admittances (18). The effect
is usually modest, as β[k] is small. However, during a severe
transient with frequency support in the order of 10 Hz, the
relationship (19) with the matrices in (18) does not hold
anymore, and an indication of transients in the phasor domain
is, in reality, a manifestation of the full dynamic behavior in
(13).

Considering the line in Fig. 1, we first assume that two
µPMUs are installed at both ends of a line, i.e., bus i and j,
which means iij [k], iji [k], vi [k] and vj [k] are all available and
they can exchange their information locally. This case helps
explaining the method that follows, which makes use of data
from a single µPMU.
We can cast the two equations that hold between the voltage
and current at two ends of the three-phase line as follows:

 


iij [k]
Y ij (f0 , k) −Y ij (f0 , k)
vi [k]
=
iji [k]
vj [k]
−Y ij (f0 , k) Y ij (f0 , k)
| {z } |
{z
} | {z } (20)
Iij [k]

RIV [k] =

Considering the following relationship:
Y ij (f + f0 )H(f ) = rect(T f )

N
−1
X
n=0

T y ij [n]e−j2πnT f (17)

Vij [k]

Let us define, with M ≥ 6, the following sample correlation
matrices:

vj [k]

n=0

Hij (f0 , k)

RV V [k] =

M
−1
X
1
H
Iij [k − m]Vij
[k − m],
M − 1 m=0

(21)

M
−1
X
1
H
Vij [k − m]Vij
[k − m].
M − 1 m=0

(22)
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Assuming that variations of Hij (f0 , k) is negligible over
a window of M samples, equation (20) implies that the
following homogeneous equation holds in quasi-steady:


 RIV [k]
I6 −Hij (f0 , k)
=0
(23)
RV V [k]
| {z }

Since the linear transformation of RV V [k] does not increase
its rank, and since we have already shown that RV V [k] is of
rank-1 during the quasi-steady state, we can conclude that:
rank(Rk ) = rank(RH
k Rk ) =
≤ rank(RV V [k]) = 1 →
rank(Rk ) = 1

Rk

Proposition 1. Correlation matrix Rk is approximately rank1 during the quasi-steady state.
Proof. During the quasi-steady state along a distribution line,
the following assumptions hold with a very good approximation for n = 0, 1, ..., M − 1:
v̂i [k − n] ≈ v̂i [k],

v̂j [k − n] ≈ v̂j [k]

βi [k − n] ≈ βi [k],

βj [k − n] ≈ βj [k],

(24)

βi [k] ≈ βj [k]
Therefore, we can write:
1
H
(Vij [k] ⊗ E[k])(Vij
[k] ⊗ EH [k])
RV V [k] =
M −1
(25)
1
H
=
(Vij [k]Vij
[k]) ⊗ (E[k]EH [k])
M −1
where E[k] is defined as follows and represents the variations
due to the off-nominal frequency:

E[k] = 16×1 ⊗ e−jβi [k](M −1) . . . e−jβi [k] 1
(26)
We can then write:
E[k]EH [k] = (16×1 11×6 ) ⊗ (M ) = M 16×6

(27)

(32)

Therefore, we can write Rk as follows:
H
2
H
Rk ≈ σ1 [k]u1 [k]ν H
1 [k] → Rk Rk ≈ σ1 [k]u1 [k]u1 [k], (33)

which means that all columns of Rk must lie in the same
hyperplane. Overall, deviation from this behavior is an indicator that the line is experiencing a transient and/or that the
three-phase measurements no longer lie over a single principal
component. The detection can be automated by computing the
following cost and tracking the fast changes in x[k] 3 :
x[k] = min ||(I12 − uuH )Rk RH
k ||F s.t. ||u|| = 1. (34)
u
The solution u is the principal subspace of Rk and it is
normally obtained by minimizing the orthogonal projection
with respect to u that is expected to ideally go to zero in the
stationary balanced case, and be close to zero for stationary
unbalanced case.
Assume now that only a single µPMU is available at one
end of a line. Using some reasonable approximations, it is still
possible to apply this rule using the data stream from a single
µPMU. For bus i with a µPMU, the two voltage vectors at
the two ends of each incident line to that bus are such that:
vj [k] = diag(α[k])vi [k],
| {z }

and therefore:
RV V [k] =

M
H
(Vij [k]Vij
[k]) ⊗ (16×6 )
M −1

α̃[k]

(28)

which accordingly means that:
H
rank(RV V [k]) = rank(Vij [k]Vij
[k]) × rank(16×6 ) = 1

where α[k] is a complex vector that relates the voltage phasors
at the two ends. If we define now:
Riv [k] =

M
−1
X
1
iij [k − m]viH [k − m],
M − 1 m=0

(36)

R(ji)
vv [k] =

M
−1
X
1
vj [k − m]viH [k − m].
M − 1 m=0

(37)

(ij)

Because:
rank(Rk ) = rank(RH
k Rk )
We analyze the rank of RH
k Rk here, where:
H
H
RH
k Rk = RIV [k]RIV [k] + RV V [k]RV V [k]

Assuming that α[k] remains constant over a window of M
samples during the quasi-steady state, we can write:
(29)

From the structure of (23) during the quasi-steady state, we
have:
RIV [k] = Hij (f0 , k)RV V [k]

(30)

Substituting (30) in (29), we have:
H
RH
k Rk = RV V [k]G ij (f0 , k)RV V [k]

(35)

(31)

(ii)
R(ji)
vv [k] ≈ α̃[k]Rvv [k]

(38)

Assuming that the variation of Y ij (f0 , k) is negligible over
M samples during the quasi-steady state, we can use (19) to
write:
!
 R(ij) [k]
iv
≈0
I3 −Y ij (f0 , k) + Y ij (f0 , k)α̃[k]
R(ii)
vv [k]
|
{z
}
(i)

Rk

where:

(39)
G ij (f0 , k) = HH
ij (f0 , k)Hij (f0 , k) + I

3 ||.||

F

denotes the Frobenious norm.
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(i)

Proposition 2. Correlation matrix Rk is approximately rank1 during the quasi-steady state.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1, and
follows by assuming that v̂i [k − n] ≈ v̂i [k], βi [k − n] ≈ βi [k],
and α[k − n] ≈ α[k] for n = 0, 1, ..., M − 1, as well as using
the structure of (39).
Proposition 2 suggests a similar criterion for a single µPMU
to flag the exit from a quasi-steady state regime, and can be
achieved by tracking the fast changes in x[k] defined as follows
for each individual incident line to that bus:
(i)

(i)

x[k] = min ||(I6 − uuH )Rk (Rk )H ||F s.t. ||u|| = 1
u
(40)
B. Multiple µPMUs Metric

We assume that each µPMU device has enough channels to
measure the voltage and all incident current measurements of
the bus on which it is installed. Hence, having a µPMU at bus i
means that the following three phase voltage phasors and three
phase current injection phasors for that bus are available:
X
[V[k]]i = vi [k], [I[k]]i =
iij [k]
(43)
j:i∼j

where i ∼ j denotes that bus i and j are connected. We
can define a permutation matrix T that parses the vector
d[k] into two sub-vectors corresponding to the non-available
measurements, du [k], and the available measurements, da [k],
that is:
 
 

Tu
du
T=
→ Td =
, HTT = Hu Ha (44)
Ta
da

In this section, we correlate the phasor data across multiple
µPMUs to detect anomalies in the grid. The applied rule here
extends the test of the quasi-steady state equations validity
applying it to multiple µPMU measurements scattered over the
grid. The rule can be hosted in the Distribution Management
System (DMS), where the data from all the µPMUs could be
available, or it can be decentralized over a set of anomaly
detection engines, where each agent is responsible to check
the anomalies on a dedicated part of the grid and sharing the
edge information with the other agents.
We assume that knowledge of Y sh
ij (f0 , 0) and Y ij (f0 , 0) for
each line in the perimeter monitored by that detector engine
is available. We can take advantage of the fact that βk is
small and consider their difference from (18) as a perturbation,
which is equivalent to noise in the observation model. For
brevity, when introducing the rule in this part, we will use
sh
Y sh
ij and Y ij to refer to Y ij (f0 , 0) and Y ij (f0 , 0).
A natural way to relate the measurements across multiple
devices is through the grid interconnection. We represent the
vector of three-phase current injection and bus voltage phasors
in the whole grid by I[k] and V[k], respectively, each vector
contains 3B elements where B is the number of buses. We
also define the vector d as follows:


I[k]
d[k] =
(41)
V[k]

where

The following set of algebraic equations are homogeneous
during the steady-state and should be close to homogeneity
during the quasi-steady state:

Hd[k] = 0, H = I3B −Y 3(B×B)
(42)

and therefore, if (45) holds, it must also hold that:

where Y is the admittance matrix of the grid that connects the
current injection to the bus voltages, and is constructed from
the 3 × 3 line shunt and series admittance matrices introduced
in Section III.
It should be noted that the elements of d in (42) are not
all independent variables. The challenge is that, in general, we
will have a very limited number of measurements of d from
µPMUs, due to the cost limitations of deploying these devices.
Let K denote the number of µPMUs that are available.

Tu ∈ {0, 1}6(K

0

×B)

, K0 = B − K

Ta ∈ {0, 1}6(K×B)
Since TT T = I, we can rewrite (42) in the following form:
Hu du [k] + Ha da [k] = 0.

(45)

Even though the equation is not exactly homogeneous, primarily due to the frequency drift discussed in Section III,
it suggests that an estimate of du can be found through the
following minimization:
x̂[k] = min ||Hu du + Ha da [k]||22 .

(46)

du

This is a least-square problem, with the well known solution:
†
dopt
u [k] = −Hu Ha da [k]

(47)

where (.)† denotes the pseudo-inverse operator. Consequently:
x̂[k] = ||(I − Hu H†u )Ha da [k]||22 ,

(48)

In fact, x̂[k] can be interpreted as follows. If we pre-multiply
both sides of (45) by the orthogonal projector onto the left
null-space of Hu i.e., (I − Hu H†u ), by definition, for any
du [k], we have:
(I − Hu H†u )Hu du [k] = 0

(49)

(I − Hu H†u )Ha da [k] = 0

(50)

which explains why the cost in (48) should be small when the
system is in quasi-steady state. What we propose is to track
the fast changes of the normalized x̂[k] defined as follows to
detect anomalies in the data.
x[k] =

||(I − Hu H†u )Ha da [k]||22
||da ||22

(51)

However, (50) becomes trivial if (I − Hu H†u ) = 0. This is
the case when Hu is a full rank square matrix or a fat matrix,
i.e., K < B2 , which has full row rank. This is actually the
most common case because the number of µPMUs is going
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to be generally very small relative to the grid size. However,
we can rely on the fact that the matrix Hu HH
u has a high
condition number, due to the weak connectivity of the radial
or weakly meshed networks, and relative homogeneity of the
line parameters. Considering the singular value decomposition
of the matrix Hu :
Hu = Uu Su VuH

(52)

We define uu,2 to denote the last column of Uu , representing
the left singular vector that corresponds to the smallest singular
value of the matrix Hu . If (45) holds, we can expect that the
x[k] defined as follows should be small with smooth variations
during the quasi-steady state:
x[k] =

2
||uH
u,2 Ha da ||2
2
||da ||2

(53)

Therefore, we propose x[k] as the quantity to track its
sudden changes in order to detect that a transient is present
and apparent through the measurements da [k] or equivalently
to spot when (45) no longer holds.
C. Fast Change Detection Method
The quantities defined in the last section for our metrics
are tracked for fast changes, since their sudden variations
are signatures of an anomaly. The quantities consist of the
optimum cost functions defined in (34) and (40) for the steadystate criterion using the data from two adjacent µPMUs and
a single µPMU, respectively, and finally, the value defined in
(53) using the data from multiple µPMUs.
Using real and simulated data, we have confirmed that
changes in the mean value during the quasi steady-state
regime are extremely smooth while deviations from this mean
value are minimal. This observation motivated us to consider
changes in their mean value as the common statistical trademark of anomalies in all of these quantities.
To achieve fast detection of such changes, we propose to
apply the sequential two-sided Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm [15]–[17]. To cast our problem in the CUSUM frame,
we approximate the samples x[k] for all the aforementioned
quantities as outcomes of a Gaussian non-zero mean process
X[k]:
X[k] = µx [k] + ωx [k]

(54)

where µx [k] is the mean of the process, and ωx [k] ∼
N (0, σx2 [k]) is zero-mean, additive Gaussian noise in the
measurements with variance σx2 [k]. We assume that ωx [k] are
independent random variables for each k. Our intention is
to detect sudden changes in the mean of the process, µx [k].
Although there is temporal correlation among the observations,
our objective, i.e., fast change detection in mean, justifies the
relaxation that the random process has independent observation samples.
The algorithm decides between two possible hypotheses at
time k: H0 : no change is detected in the mean, H1 : change
is detected in the mean. The decision in the CUSUM algorithm is based on two “instantaneous log-likelihood ratios”,

corresponding to upward and downward change of the mean,
defined as follows:
!
|δbx |
|δbx |
u
λX [k] = + 2
x[k] − µ
b0,x [k] −
(55a)
σ
bx [k]
2
!
bx |
bx |
|
δ
|
δ
λdX [k] = − 2
x[k] − µ
b0,x [k] +
(55b)
σ
bx [k]
2
where the superscripts u and d represent the variables corresponding to the “upward” and “downward” change detection
respectively. δbx is the mean change estimate, and is initialized
based on “a priori” knowledge. σ
bx2 [k] is the random process
variance estimate that is assumed to remain constant during
the change and µ
b0,x [k] is the mean estimate. The mean
estimate is obtained adaptively from normal ensembles using
the exponential window as follows:
µ
b0,x [k] =ρ µ
b0,x [k − 1] + (1 − ρ)x[k]

(56)

where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 determines the dependency of the mean
estimator on the past samples compared to the current sample
u
respectively. Accordingly, two cumulative sums, MX
[k] and
d
u
d
MX [k], and two decision functions, GX [k] and GX [k], are
derived as follows.
u
u
MX
[k] =MX
[k − 1] + λuX [k]

(57a)

d
MX
[k]
u
GX [k]
GdX [k]

(57b)

d
=MX
[k

− 1] +

= max(GuX [k
= max(GdX [k

λdX [k]

− 1] +
− 1] +

λuX [k], 0)
λdX [k], 0)

(57c)
(57d)

The decision functions are then compared to a user-defined
threshold, αx . Then, hypothesis H1 for the upward or downward change in the mean is chosen if either GuX [k] > αx or
GdX [k] > αx , respectively. Depending on the change direction,
the estimate of the anomaly start time is:
b
kc,x =

argmin

u/d

MX [kc,x ]

(58)

k0,x ≤kc,x ≤k−1

where k0,x is the last detected change time index.
During an event, we expect to see multiple change points.
Detection of multiple changes is done by resetting the decision
functions and cumulative sums to zero after the change is detected, and continuing the dynamic rule for upcoming samples.
The fast change anomaly is completed if no new changes are
detected for a defined window of time.
V. N UMERICAL R ESULTS
A. Field Recorded Data
Field recorded data is obtained from µPMUs that are
installed in our partner utility medium voltage (12.47 kV) grid.
The window of data that we use to validate our detection rules
contains a voltage sag event recorded on the network. The
captured three phase voltage phasor magnitude by one of the
µPMUs during this event is shown in Fig. 3.
The µPMUs used in this use case are installed in pairs at
opposite ends of a line. We first show, for a specific line the
change detection using the optimum cost function defined in

3190

29

Magnitude of Voltage Phasor

28

12

1.05

27

11

Phase A
Phase B
Phase C

Voltage (p.u.)

1
0.95

1

3

4

6

7

10

8

22
13

14

9

Substation

26
21

25

30

31

20

5

T1

R2

0.9

23 24

32

33
34

19
15

0.85
0.8

16

17

18
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Fig. 3. Three Phase Voltage Phasor Magnitude Captured by a µPMU During
the Voltage Sag

(34) with two µPMUs data, and then demonstrate that it would
be possible to detect the changes with a single µPMU using
(40). The size of the null space using two and one µPMU
during the voltage sag event is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) and
Fig. 4(b) with M = 32 samples, respectively 4 . It can be
observed that our metrics are able to effectively detect the
anomaly as changes in the null-space, even when there is
only one µPMU installed. The red markers are pointing to
the detected anomaly start time, k̂c . Although the behavior in
double and single µPMU metric is very similar, the change in
the double-µPMU case is more pronounceable (noticing the
scale on the vertical axis), obviously because it is augmenting
the effects of the voltage sag on two µPMUs rather than one.
It should be noted that since the value of the optimum cost
Double- µPMU Metric
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0
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0
10:20:28.908

time-series simulation environment of DIgSILENT [19] and
the time-domain waveforms are forwarded to our simulated
µPMU model to obtain the phasor representation. We used
the two-cycle P class filter in C.37.118 standard [11] in
our simulated µPMU since we did not have access to the
proprietary filters implemented within the µPMU. This allows
us to more closely mirror what a µPMU actually outputs in
comparison to simulations that use FFT to extract the phasors.
We consider a SLG fault scenario to assess how our rules
perform. We assume that three µPMUs, i.e., K = 3, are
available and are placed at bus 9, 19, and 31. The µPMU
placement is done aiming to achieve the maximum change
in (53) during a transient. The detailed formulation of the
placement problem will be given in our future work.
A temporary SLG fault at 50% on phase A of line (16, 17)
occurs at t = 0.5 sec and is cleared at t = 0.52 sec, before the
recloser opens. Fig. 6 shows the single µPMU metric derived
in (40) using the current on lines (9, 13), (19, 20) and (31, 32)
with M = 6 5 . The detected start time of the changes are
marked for these three µPMUs during the event using the
same detection threshold and “a priori” knowledge about the
magnitude of the change. As it can be observed, the number
of changes found in each line’s metric is correlated with how
severely the event affects that particular µPMU measurement.
The metric can be formed for all the incident lines to the buses
with µPMUs, however, we just show the cost relating to the
aforementioned lines. Clearly, in each case x[k], calculated
Single µPMU Metric
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Fig. 4. Double and Single µPMU Metric Using Real Data for a Sag Event

Line (19,20)

-4
5 *10

1

0.04

Line (31,32)

4

0.8

x

x

3

x

function at time k depends on the last M phasor samples,
there is a delay in the appearing and disappearing of the event
in the cost functions.
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B. Simulated Data
The IEEE 34-bus system is simulated in this section to
test the rules on simulated data. The single-line diagram is
shown in Fig. 5, where the bus numbers are restarted from
1, compared to original feeder, for simplicity. The test feeder
data can be found at [18]. The simulation is performed in the

for each line, experiences a sudden change due to the fault
event being sufficiently severe to shift all of the lines into

4 The voltage and current phasors are first converted to per-unit system
assuming Sb = 1 MVA.

5 The voltage and current phasors are first converted to per-unit system
assuming Sb = 1 MVA.
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Fig. 6. Single µPMU Metric Using Simulated Data for SLG Fault
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a transient state. It is important to note that since phasor
calculation is based on the past two-cycles of time-domain
data, and since the cost function is affected by the M − 1
previous phasor samples, as also the case for the real data,
the anomaly appears and disappears with a delay in the cost
function. To reduce the delay, the phasor can be estimated
with less samples, e.g., one cycle instead of two cycles, but
the associated accuracy decreases. In addition, M can be set
to the minimum possible value, which was the case here. The
metric across multiple µPMUs in (53) is also tested for this
scenario and the corresponding metric, as well as the start
time of the detected changes, are shown in Fig. 7. As we
expected, the fault manifests itself as a sudden change across
the µPMUs; a signature of an anomaly. The delay here is
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Fig. 7. Detected Changes in the Metric Across Multiple µPMUs for SingleLine to Ground Fault

solely due to the two-cycle calculation of the phasor, therefore
less in comparison to the single µPMU metric.
Metrics Sensitivity to µPMU Data Manipulation: An advantage of our metric across multiple µPMUs is that it is
robust to some degree to the µPMU data manipulation. In
fact, as long as some of µPMU data are not compromised,
the metric reveals the presence of a transient. What matters
here is whether the change is sufficiently severe to trigger the
change detector. If the detector is set to be too sensitive, the
“false alarms” increase, so there is an associated trade-off that
should be considered when the detector is designed. However,
this study is beyond the scope of this paper.
To test the performance of our metric in this situation,
we consider again the single-line to ground fault previously
explained for three cases where the attacker manipulates the
data samples of the µPMU at bus 9 for the first case, the
µPMU at bus 19 in the second case, and finally µPMUs at
buses 9 and bus 19 together for the third case. The attacker
manipulates the data during the fault by pointing to the last
sample before the fault starts. Fixing the detector parameters
for all the three cases, Fig. 8 shows the detected changes in
the metric across multiple µPMUs. It can be observed that the
metric shows sudden changes in all the three cases. For the first
and the second case, a few changes can still be detected by our

CUSUSM detector. However, when both µPMU 9 and 19 are
manipulated (case 3), the detector fails to spot the transient.
It is also clear that our single µPMU metric can only flag an
anomaly if the corresponding µPMU data is not compromised.
However, it should be mentioned that injecting false data at
the device level is not an easy task for the attacker since the
µPMU devices are designed to be read-only. In fact, manin-the-middle attacks are more likely, which in this case, our
single µPMU rule that is checked next to each device can
detect the anomaly, even when the multiple µPMU rule is
compromised.
Metrics Sensitivity to Grid Connectivity Manipulation: The
attacker can falsify the grid connectivity data to mislead our
intrusion detector. Our single µPMU rule is set up to be
agnostic about the grid interconnection, and therefore is not
affected by such an attack. However, the grid connectivity
becomes important for our rule using all the µPMU data.
Case–1: We assume that grid connectivity data is manipulated, indicating that line (25, 26) is out of service, while
it is in service. The reason for choosing line (25, 26) in our
scenario is that no µPMU is installed on the lateral from bus 25
to 29 so we cannot confirm the line outage by just looking at
the magnitude of the current phasor of that µPMU. However,
if a line outage is the ground truth, we expect to see a sudden
change in our metrics because of the transient induced by
the line switching before the step variation due to the change
of topology. This expected transient is not observable in our
metric, as can be seen in Fig. 9, and therefore this indication
of a line outage can be flagged as an intrusion.
Case–2: In this case, we assume that a three-phase fault
occurs on line (25, 26) at t = 0.4s, resulting in the outage
of the line due to the fuse operation at t = 0.46s. Therefore
the lateral 25 − 29 is deenergized. The attacker falsifies the
data, indicating that the line (25, 26) is still in service after
the transient finishes. Fig. 10 shows the correct and the
compromised metric. An attack is undetectable by our multiple
µPMU metric if the attacker is able to compromise some data,
while not changing the value of the metric significantly before
and after the fault. In our case, as we can observe in Fig. 10,
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upstream of the event location. We will also present the
optimal placement of the µPMU sensors with respect to our
multiple µPMU metric to achieve the maximum change in
the metric when an anomaly happens, as well as methods
to localize the events that caused the transient. We will also
propose a formal architecture for the implementation of our
anomaly detectors in the context of cyber-physical security,
where the analysis results of the µPMU data will be tied with
the monitored DSCADA traffic for intrusion detection.
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the value of the compromised metric (post-fault value) is close
to the ground truth (pre-fault value), and therefore this rule is
not able to detect the associated data manipulation in this case.
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VI. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated two types of metrics
for anomaly detection using µPMU measurements for the
distribution grid. The first metric requires phasor data of
a single device and is agnostic about the grid model. The
second metric correlates data across multiple µPMUs to
flag events. Anomalies are detected applying the sequential
CUSUM algorithm in search for a sudden change in their mean
value. To be more realistic, the rules have been formulated
recognizing that the grid is in the quasi-steady state during the
normal operation rather than operating at nominal frequency.
In addition, the distribution grid has been modeled allowing
for unbalanced load, absent of the assumption of transposed
lines and considering the fact that there may be two-phases
or single phase laterals in the grid. The proposed rules have
been verified using the real and synthetic data.
For future work, we will extend our rules to robustify the
intrusion detector. For example, case-2 in the grid connectivity
data manipulation can be identified as anomaly by checking
the post and pre-fault power flow measured by the µPMU
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